[Financial News] Differences in approach among the top military leadership of South Korea and the United States over detailed verification criteria for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and command authority under the armistice regime surfaced simultaneously at National Assembly audit hearings and in Washington. After General Xavier T. Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, took a forceful, principled stance on his official social media account, discussing responsibility for enforcing the Armistice Agreement and forces seeking to drive a wedge between the allies, Defense Minister Kang Shin-cheol revealed the gap in perspectives by raising the possibility of an immediate transfer based on “mutual trust in the ROK-U.S. alliance.” ■ Minister Kang’s direct challenge: “If there is trust, the command structure would be stronger even if OPCON were transferred tomorrow”Appearing on the 15th at the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee’s audit of the military court, Defense Minister Kang Shin-cheol stated that he had formally conveyed military-level concerns about recent remarks by General Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, while expressing strong confidence in the South Korean military’s independent defense leadership and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. combined defense system. Minister Kang declared, “If trust in the ROK-U.S. alliance is assured, there would be no problem at all with transferring OPCON right now or even tomorrow.” On changes to the command structure, he explained the military rationale, saying, “It will shift to a concept in which a South Korean commander who knows Korea well leads, supported by the strongest U.S. military,” and, “A structure led by a South Korean military commander and backed up by the U.S. military could be a stronger command structure than the one we have now.” He likened the OPCON verification process to the realms of “Science,” or quantitative scientific analysis, and “Art,” or strategic qualitative judgment, arguing that the conditions could be met if there were trust in the alliance (Art). However, he made clear that the basic framework of the “three conditions,” including the South Korean military’s ability to lead combined defense, would remain unchanged, regardless of whether the conditions for OPCON transfer themselves were revised.■ Commander Brunson’s pointed SNS remarks: “It is my duty to defend the territories of both South Korea and the United States”The arguments put forward by the U.S. government and its top military leadership in Washington, D.C., are firmly grounded in “responsibility for the armistice regime and agreed documents,” as reflected in remarks General Brunson has posted on his personal social media account. Shortly after speaking at a seminar hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), General Brunson used his official social media account to emphasize the distinctive nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance and his duty as commander to defend territory. “I spoke today at the summit. The ROK-U.S. alliance has lasted for over 70 years and is unlike any other alliance in the world. Defending the territory of both the Republic of Korea and the United States is my duty.” (I spoke at the summit today. The ROK-U.S. alliance has lasted for more than 70 years and is unlike any other alliance in the world. It is my duty to defend the territories of both the Republic of Korea and the United States.) General Brunson then posted messages addressing the current security landscape on the Korean Peninsula and the nature of the armistice regime. “How can a peace regime be established in a place where peace does not exist? Armistice is not peace.” (How can a peace regime be established where peace does not exist? An armistice is not peace.) “Although South Korea did not sign the armistice agreement, I have a responsibility to enforce the agreement to protect the South Korean people.” (Although South Korea did not sign the Armistice Agreement, I have a responsibility to enforce it to protect the South Korean people.) In particular, he pointed to the historical limitation that the Republic of Korea did not directly sign the Armistice Agreement, and asserted the legitimacy of his armistice-management mission on behalf of South Korea and the United States. “We have an agreed document. However, the Republic of Korea did not sign the armistice agreement. Nevertheless, I am tasked with executing that agreement to protect the Korean people.” (We have an agreed document. But the Republic of Korea did not sign the Armistice Agreement. Nevertheless, I have been tasked with enforcing it to protect the Korean people.) At the same time, General Brunson said of those seeking to exploit openings amid changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula: “There are forces everywhere trying to disparage and drive a wedge into the ROK-U.S. alliance.” (There are forces everywhere seeking to disparage and drive a wedge into the ROK-U.S. alliance.) On formal OPCON verification, the commander said, “I am in full support of OPCON transfer that is conditions-based. Full stop.” (I fully support conditions-based OPCON transfer. That is all.) He nevertheless concluded, “But conditions have changed, and because we have changed our plans, there are new standards that must be met.” (But conditions have changed, and because we have changed our operational plans, new standards must be met.) He thereby again emphasized the importance of quantitative verification.■ The framework for OPCON transfer: What the 2014 46th SCM’s “COTP” agreement entailsForeign affairs and security experts say General Brunson’s pointed social media remarks and principled rhetoric reflect an effort to uphold the spirit of the “Condition-Based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP)” document signed at the 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2014, during the Park Geun-hye administration. They noted that the core of the COTP agreed at the time was to eliminate a political deadline stating “OPCON will be transferred by [a specified year].” At the time, the two countries’ defense ministers formally agreed on “three conditions” to prevent the risks of a deadline-driven transfer: △ securing key military capabilities for the South Korean military △ the alliance’s comprehensive capability to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats △ a security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region conducive to a stable transfer. The top U.S. military leadership is focused on the reality that the ROK-U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear joint operational plan (OPLAN) was comprehensively revised during the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration, as North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the regional security environment has deteriorated. Since the operational plan has changed completely in military terms, the requirements for specific reconnaissance assets and the quantitative standards for response capabilities (Science) needed to meet the three conditions in the 2014 SCM agreement must also be reassessed in light of the changing battlefield environment—an evident military fact. Minister Kang’s somewhat skeptical stance on the proposal to change the OPCON transfer approach entirely from “conditions-based” to a “fixed date”—saying that it “requires agreement between the governments of both countries”—is also understood to reflect his awareness of these firm U.S. principles.■ Overseas military think tanks assess the weight of OPCON in the “First Island Chain” mega-theaterThe sharp difference in perspective between South Korea and the United States must be viewed beyond the local sphere of the Korean Peninsula, amid a sweeping shift in the global security paradigm. In a recent report, the U.K.-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a world-renowned defense and security think tank, analyzed how military geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region is being rapidly reshaped, moving beyond bilateral alliances between individual countries toward a multilateral combined defense system (the “kill web”). According to IISS’s latest analysis, the core deterrence strategy envisioned by the top U.S. military leadership is structured around grouping the entire “First Island Chain,” stretching from the Kuril Islands through Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, into one vast “Mega Theater.” This aligns with Europe’s collective defense concept under “Article 5 of NATO.” IISS said that the trend of South Korea and the United States upgrading their operational plans in response to the growing North Korean nuclear threat and changes in the regional security environment is also directly connected to this kind of multilateral collective deterrence mechanism.■ Implications of the “Pershing Rule,” a cardinal principle of modern U.S. military cooperationMeanwhile, underlying the debate over the quantitative conditions for ROK-U.S. OPCON transfer and the handover of command authority is the “Pershing Rule,” a long-standing U.S. military principle. Established by U.S. General John Pershing during World War I, the principle centers on fully delegating authority over military operations and command to field commanders while not publicly exposing the limits of friendly forces’ key surveillance capabilities and intelligence assets. The U.S. military leadership’s uncompromisingly “Science”-centered approach to verifying OPCON transfer is fully consistent with the Pershing Rule. Until it has been scientifically proven that operational plans and the precision detection capabilities of combined assets are fully in place, not allowing political schedules or deadline pressure to force a premature transfer of military sovereignty is the nature of field command and an inviolable principle. Ultimately, this makes clear that the OPCON issue should not be treated merely as a political dispute over the timing of a command handover, but as a broader realignment of the alliance: how to maximize the value of sharing key combined-force assets and real-time intelligence networks under the Pershing Rule, while optimizing combined deterrence across the entire Asia-Pacific region. [email protected] Lee Jong-yun Reporter