[fn Plaza] The Korean Peninsula at a Crossroads of "Crisis and Opportunity"

"Which will enter Pyongyang first, McDonald's or Coca-Cola? Which company will be the first to put up a giant billboard on the streets of Pyongyang?"
It was 2000, when reconciliation between the United States and North Korea was gaining momentum and talks on establishing diplomatic relations were underway. In diplomatic circles in Seoul and Washington, such predictions and discussions were common.
On Oct. 11 that year, Jo Myong-rok, a powerful figure in North Korea's military and first vice chairman of the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, visited The White House in military uniform and delivered a personal letter from Kim Jong Il to then U.S. President Bill Clinton.
The next day, the two countries issued a "joint statement" and declared an end to hostile relations. They confirmed a broad improvement in ties, respect for sovereignty and the transformation of the armistice system into a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime. They also agreed to hold four-party talks for that purpose. The Clinton administration appeared ready to move quickly on expanded economic exchanges, humanitarian aid and removing North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
On Oct. 23, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright flew to Pyongyang and held two meetings with Kim Jong Il over three days and two nights. The two sides discussed Clinton's possible visit to North Korea and the opening of reciprocal liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington, D.C.
Expectations were rising that liaison offices would soon open in both capitals and that diplomatic normalization was near. But the process ran into obstacles it could not overcome, including the political turmoil of a presidential transition to the Republican Party and controversy over North Korea's uranium enrichment program.
After nearly two decades of drift, the two countries finally began seeking a breakthrough during Trump's first term. In June 2018, the first North Korea–United States Singapore Summit was held, and the two leaders agreed on improving relations, establishing new bilateral ties, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and pursuing denuclearization. But the Hanoi summit in February 2019 ended without agreement because the two sides remained divided over reciprocal steps such as denuclearization measures and sanctions relief. As a result, not only North Korea-U.S. ties but also inter-Korean relations froze into confrontation.
President Donald Trump shook up the stalemate on the 16th by ordering a reduction in RIMPAC. The next day, he said Kim Jong Un had responded to his call for dialogue. He described the response as "very positive." On the 19th, he went further, saying North Korea had "57 very powerful nuclear weapons" and appearing to take a conciliatory stance that effectively acknowledged North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state. It was the kind of remark Pyongyang had been hoping for as it pushed for nuclear arms control talks. North Korea, which has enshrined its nuclear status in its Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has been demanding international recognition as a nuclear-armed state while insisting that "there is no longer any discussion of denuclearization."
Trump also said he could meet Kim this year, signaling a strong desire to resume talks with North Korea as soon as possible. Foreign media outlets reported that Trump had been pressing his aides to restart talks with Kim in the fall and had also discussed the possibility of an in-person meeting during his next trip to Asia. That is why the APEC Summit in Shenzhen this November has emerged as a likely opportunity.
After Trump offered carrots such as a sharp reduction in RIMPAC and what amounted to recognition of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Workers' Party of Korea, said on the 19th that it was "not even worth commenting on" and that she had "no interest at all," denying any leader-to-leader communication. On the 20th, North Korea staged a show of force by firing a barrage of short-range ballistic missiles. Even so, the prevailing view is that these reactions are meant to raise Pyongyang's price ahead of any resumption of face-to-face talks.
In the fall of 2000, North Korea-U.S. diplomatic normalization seemed within reach. Could it become visible again this fall? In the more than 20 years that were lost, North Korea has expanded its nuclear capabilities, and the international balance in Northeast Asia has also changed amid the war in Ukraine and closer Russia-China-North Korea relations.
The range of North Korea's ICBM, now reaching closer to the contiguous United States after passing Hawaii, has deepened concerns that time is on Pyongyang's side. There is also concern that Trump, facing the midterm election, may focus on a campaign-friendly result such as North Korea's declaration of a moratorium on attacks against the contiguous United States. Since the start of the year, the Trump administration has worked hard to use normalization with North Korea as a political card, knocking on Pyongyang's closed door through various channels.
South Korea could end up seeing its interests damaged by Trump's transactional diplomacy and by the push for "McDonald's and Coca-Cola in Pyongyang." At a time when North Korea-U.S. dialogue could accelerate, this is the moment to ensure that South Korea's voice is not lost by strengthening coordination with the United States and international cooperation more than ever. We must gather more wisdom as the Northeast Asian order shifts and fractures. Once again, the Korean Peninsula stands at a crossroads between crisis and opportunity.
[email protected] Reporter