[Editorial] On U.S. Section 301 Tariffs, Korea Must Ensure the Final Rate Stays Capped at 15%

The United States decided on the 23rd local time to impose so-called "forced labor tariffs" on 60 countries, including South Korea, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Financial News reported. For Korean products, the tariffs will be applied so that the total, combined with existing most-favored-nation duties, reaches at least 12.5%. The United States set different country-specific rates in line with existing trade agreements, using 10% for the European Union and Taiwan, and 12.5% for Korea and Japan. Because products imported from these 60 countries account for 99% of total U.S. imports, the move is effectively a universal tariff aimed at nearly all of Washington's trading partners.
This measure can be seen as reviving, under a different legal basis, the reciprocal tariffs that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unlawful. After those tariffs were invalidated, the United States imposed a 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, and then finalized the Section 301 tariffs just seven hours before that deadline expired.
The United States is also conducting a separate Section 301 investigation into structural overproduction. Products already subject to item-specific tariffs, such as steel, aluminum and automobiles, were excluded from the new forced labor tariffs. Still, the possibility of further pressure through other tools, including Section 301 overproduction measures and Section 338, remains. President Trump recently decided to impose an additional 50% tariff on Canadian wine and other goods under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Korea has no choice but to treat tariff risks stemming from Trump as a permanent trade threat and prepare accordingly.
Above all, Seoul must prevent the simultaneous imposition of tariffs from effectively nullifying the agreement between the two countries. Last year, Korea pledged $350 billion in investment in the United States in exchange for a reduction in the previously announced 25% tariff to 15%. Cheong Wa Dae also said it would consult with Washington so that the final rate, including the forced labor tariffs and any future overcapacity tariffs, would not exceed 15%. Although both countries appear to agree that existing commitments must be honored, that is not enough. Korea must secure a clear guarantee that, regardless of any additional tariff label, the final tariff burden on Korean products will not exceed 15%.
If the 15% cap collapses, trust between the two countries will inevitably be shaken as well. Korea promised massive investment in the United States and expanded local production in order to reduce tariff uncertainty and secure stable trading conditions. If those large-scale investments are carried out without receiving the promised trade conditions, the blow will be significant not only to the competitiveness of Korean companies but also to the government's trade policy and the broader Korea-U.S. economic alliance. The government should actively use Korean companies' investment and job creation in the United States as leverage in negotiations to preserve the 15% cap and even win item-specific exemptions.
Domestic follow-up measures are also urgent. The United States cited weak laws and enforcement systems for blocking goods produced through forced labor as the basis for the tariffs. The government needs to bring its ban on imports of forced-labor goods and its supply-chain due diligence system into line with international standards.