[Correspondent's Column] The World That Will Emerge After the Smoke of War

Since February 28 this year, the entire world has been consumed by the war itself.
Attention is fixed on how high oil prices will rise, when the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, and how far the military clash might escalate. Yet the more important question lies elsewhere: what kind of global order will take shape once this war is over?
The world today is shrouded in a thick fog. Smoke from the battlefield and deep uncertainty cloud our vision. History, however, has repeatedly shown that the moment the fog lifts, the real contours of the world are laid bare.
The historical record is clear. During World War I (WWI) and World War II, nations were absorbed in the victories and defeats at the front. But when the wars ended, what emerged was the collapse of the Europe-centered order and the rise of the United States (US). It was not the military power of the victors that ultimately defined the postwar world, but a new financial order built around the United States dollar (USD). The oil shocks of the 1970s at first looked like a simple spike in oil prices. Over time, however, they gave birth to "energy security" as a core pillar of national strategy. In the heat of war and conflict, these shifts are hard to see, but once the fog clears, the underlying structure is always different.
The current conflict will be no exception. The US is already demonstrating its maritime supremacy and its leverage over energy supplies once again. The real question is what comes next.
After the war, the costs and responsibilities that the US asks its allies to shoulder are likely to grow far larger than they are now.
In Europe, Washington is pressing for higher defense spending and reduced dependence on external energy. In Asia, it is stepping up demands that allies take part in maritime security and in reshaping supply chains. The old arrangement of "security from the US, costs borne by the allies" is reaching a turning point, shifting toward a model in which security burdens and costs are shared. US President Donald John Trump has repeatedly mentioned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, and South Korea in connection with this war. He has called on them to participate in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. For now, they have politely demurred. But once the war ends, that request is likely to be seen less as a matter of choice and more as a matter of responsibility.
Rifts within the alliance system are another variable. In this crisis, some European countries have drawn a line against military involvement, while major emerging powers such as the Republic of India (India) have sought to maintain an independent course. Even if a US-centered order is reaffirmed after the war, the cohesion of its alliances may well be looser than before. That would mark a shift toward an era of "conditional alliances," in which countries calibrate their distance on an issue-by-issue basis.
Changes in the global economy are also unavoidable. In energy markets, the issue is unlikely to remain just about prices; it is more likely to lead to a reconfiguration of the supply routes themselves. Efforts to secure alternative routes and strengthen stockpiling strategies in order to reduce dependence on the Middle East will inevitably drive up costs. Supply chains, too, are moving away from an efficiency-first model toward one that puts security first. Even after the war ends, it will be difficult for logistics and energy costs to quickly return to previous levels. This will prolong global inflationary pressures and inevitably constrain the room for maneuver of central banks.
Against this backdrop, South Korea’s choices are clear. First, it must redefine energy security as a top national priority. That means going beyond simply diversifying import sources to simultaneously expand storage capacity and investment in alternative energy. Second, it needs far more sophisticated alliance management. Cooperation with the US should be strengthened, but balanced with a strategy that preserves economic and diplomatic autonomy. Third, South Korea must respond proactively to the reordering of supply chains. In key sectors such as semiconductors and batteries, reinforcing its position as a reliable supplier is synonymous with strengthening national competitiveness.
Every war eventually ends. The order that follows, however, lasts far longer. In the fog of the present, it is hard to see far ahead. But once the fog lifts, it becomes clear who has been reading the board. What is needed now is not just a fixation on the outcome of the war, but a clear-eyed view of the world that will follow. Whether South Korea becomes a passive beneficiary of that new order or an active architect of it already depends on how well it prepares today.
pride@fnnews.com Reporter