Saturday, July 19, 2025prod

[fn Editorial] Transfer of Wartime Operational Control, Premised on Self-Defense and Maintaining the ROK-US Alliance

Input
2025-07-16 18:02:53
Updated
2025-07-16 18:02:53
On the repatriation remark, the Presidential Office says "personal opinion"
Many issues to resolve such as dispelling North Korean misjudgments
Ahn Kyubaek, the nominee for Minister of National Defense, stated on the 15th that "the goal is to reclaim (transfer) wartime operational control during the term of the Lee Jaemyung government," sparking controversy. Wartime operational control refers to the exercise of all operational authority, including strategy formulation and troop deployment, in times of emergency. Currently, the United States holds this authority, but we intend to reclaim it. However, this is an issue that must be handled very carefully as it could significantly impact the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula.

This authority was entrusted to our ally, the United States, during the Korean War. For the Republic of Korea, which was left with only the scars of war, military and economic support from the world's superpower, the United States, was crucial, and President Syngman Rhee handed over operational command to the UN Commander in July 1950. After being divided into 'wartime' and 'peacetime' in 1994, we first reclaimed peacetime operational control.

The transfer of wartime operational control has been a hot issue, particularly under progressive governments. After agreeing on the transfer during the ROK-US summit in November 2006 under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the timeline has been repeatedly delayed, and currently, only the final stage of evaluating full mission capability remains without a set timeline for the transfer. As a former official of the New Politics National Assembly (predecessor of the Democratic Party of Korea) and having served as the chairman of the National Defense Committee, candidate Ahn would have wanted to conclude the issue of wartime operational control transfer, which was initiated 20 years ago, under the Lee Jaemyung government.

However, justification alone is not enough. We must maintain the framework of the ROK-US alliance while realizing the will for self-defense, balance the security in Northeast Asia, and consider the possibility of North Korea's misjudgment. The transfer of wartime operational control is a 'complex equation' that requires finding the optimal balance between the ideal of realizing self-defense and the practical security strategy. President Lee Jaemyung also pledged the transfer of wartime operational control but did not set a specific timeline. The Presidential Office's hasty clarification as "the candidate's personal opinion" is in the same context.

The transfer of wartime operational control is the final puzzle in the journey towards completing military sovereignty. However, there are many hurdles to overcome. First, we must ensure that the ROK-US combined defense posture is well maintained after the transfer through strategic planning from the outset. We must also prepare for the possibility of the relocation of US Forces Korea, a core element of the US's Northeast Asia security strategy. Since the US has transferred operational control to us, there is a high possibility that they will strategically alter the current operational system of US Forces Korea.

Above all, we must be cautious that North Korea does not perceive the transfer of wartime operational control as a signal of weakening the ROK-US alliance. North Korea is always sensitive to any cracks in the alliance. If the transfer of wartime operational control is perceived as weakening the ROK-US combined defense posture, North Korea may interpret it as a signal of alliance fatigue and could resort to local military clashes, cyber or missile provocations, or a seventh nuclear test.

For us, it is crucial to clearly convey the message that the ROK-US combined operational capability remains strong even after the transfer of wartime operational control. In this process, the US's 'security bill' may arrive, demanding enhanced verification of the Korean military's operational capabilities, increased defense cost-sharing, and expanded purchases of US weapon systems. Ultimately, the key is to find a balance between maintaining the ROK-US alliance and realizing self-defense.